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James T. Bonnen
For decades this society has underinvested  complex and as yet poorly understood macro-
in the social sciences relative to the biological  economic  impacts  on  agriculture  and rural
and physical sciences. In partial consequence,  communities. We still need to understand the
today the changing agenda of problems of the  impacts  of national  deregulation  of finance,
society falls increasingly  into the domain  of  banking,  energy,  and  transportation  on
the social sciences.  Ironically the cumulative  agriculture and rural communities  and their
effect of this underinvestment is now creating  welfare.
a unique window of opportunity for the social  Globalization  of agricultural  markets  and
sciences.  growing international  economic  and political
Many  of  today's  problems  are  the  interdependence  have created  a new  policy
consequence of pursuing technological change  context and severely constrained national pol-
without concern for external effects.  Most of  icy options. We face international issues rang-
our environmental and many of our structural  ing from protectionism and an immense trade
problems  in  the  United  States today  arise  deficit to the impact  of obsolescent interna-
from this source. Over seven to eight decades,  tional monetary institutions on exchange rates
we have created great productivity plus many  and market stability. Indeed, the excess  ca-
unanticipated  and  undesired side  effects. In  pacity, retaliatory protectionism, and compe-
addition,  both agriculture  and  society  have  tition  in  export  subsidies  have  turned  the
changed greatly. What we value as a society  agricultural policy crises of individual indus-
haschanged. We now face needs fortechnology  trial nations into a single worldwide interna-
assessment, new institutional innovations, and  tional trade crisis-which is now beyond the
related investments in human and conventional  reach of the policy actions of any nation acting
capital,  plus  research  on  ethics  and  values,  alone.  Only international cooperation and the
These fall in good part into the domains of the  creation of new international institutions holds
social  sciences,  as  well  as  some  of  the  much promise. These problems all fall primar-
humanities, for which we have failed to provide  ily in the domain of social science knowledge.
adequately.  The agenda goes on. The institutional struc-
ture (i.e., organizations and rules) supporting
THE NEW RURAL AGENDA  science in agriculture and for society generally
is in transition to some new configuration with
almost  no  research  on  the  issues  involved,
Let me list a few of the diverse issues on thee  e research funding systems such as alternative research funding systems
current rural and agricultural agenda for which  orthemeansforinterlinkageandcoordination
the social sciences have some major responsi-  of the various R  & D actors and users. U. S.
bility.1 We have been experiencing the largest  science policy is in disarray and contest. Public
financial  crisis in agriculture  since the Great  support  has  declined.  Except  in  agriculture
Depression. Farmers and rural businesses are  medicine,  U.S.  science  policy  has  been
in trouble  as  are rural financial  institutions  aed t  s  science  and national shaped to support basic science and national
and the  agricultural  credit  system. We  face  defense. The university and academic science
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41are now being asked to sustain national eco-  In the  past,  most  human  capital  has  been
nomic  development,  a  goal  that  academic  formed in the family, not in the education and
research  in  agriculture  has  long  addressed  health systems, as the conventional  view as-
(Bonnen, 1986a).  sumes. But increasing disorder and instability
The new genetic  technologies  are  begin-  in  the  American  family  suggest  a reduced
ning to change the way agricultural science is  capacity for the formation of effective human
funded and managed. It is raising new issues  beings. Social and economic issues surround-
in property rights to genetic material as well  ing the family and its institutional substitutes
as to processes for genetic manipulation. New  are increasingly urgent problems. Low-income
institutions  are  necessary  for  social  accep-  blacks and Hispanics will constitute an aston-
tance and  effective use of new genetic tech-  ishingly  high  and  rising  percent  of the  en-
nologies.  trants to the labor force over the next genera-
The nation's  farm  policy is  obsolete  in a  tion. Unless the society invests in their human
global  competitive  economy  but  continues  capabilities, the productivity and competitive-
without the political will to constrain either its  ness of the society will be at hazard.
costs or the chronic excess capacity that gave  The window  of opportunity  for the social
it rise. The issue of the structure of agriculture  sciences is problematic. That is, there are many
must  be  faced,  including  the  future  social  problems  that require  social  science  knowl-
performance  of a farming  and  agribusiness  edge, but public support for such research and
sector that will be much more highly concen-  professional activity will not be automatic. We
trated and vertically integrated.  must overcome a skepticism of the social sci-
Information-age technologies are changing  ences by demonstrating that we have a useful
the way we  receive,  process,  store  and  use  contribution to make. The social sciences con-
information, not only in farm and agribusiness  stitute an important part of society's capacity
decision making but in-government and gen-  for  understanding  social  problems,  but  we
eralbusiness. Near real-time interactions and  often find ourselves  in a "prove-it drill,"  de-
consequences are changing our problems and  spite past major contributions.
social options (Dillman; Bonnen, 1986b). Adapt-  Investing in the social sciences is predomi-
ing agricultural  and rural  social institutions  nantly  a public  responsibility,  especially  in
and policies to these and other new technolo-  those matters that deal with public policy. The
gies presents a substantial research and edu-  private sector cannot be expected to invest in
cation challenge in the social sciences.  this sort of research to any great extent since
The fragility of the ecosystem and related  it has little capacity to recover  any returns
environmental issues cry out for new institu-  from such investments.
tions and policies. Both groundwater contami-  It is worth noting that the increased  need
nation and air pollution are serious and grow-  for social science research is occurring at some-
ing problems. Waste disposal and toxic chemi-  what different levels of government than  in
cals affect  health, degrade  the environment,  the past. The international  interdependence
and threaten  the biosphere.  Conflicts  over  and  integration  of  capital  and  commodity
natural resource  use and conservation  grow  markets,  which  erodes  national sovereignty
more contentious.  and policy capacity,  is pushing the possibility
Poverty in the United States has increased  of effective policy  action for many economic
at record rates since 1978 (Porter and Green-  sectors  (1) out  of product markets  and  into
stein). Rural poverty has increased faster than  factor markets and (2) from national levels of
that of central cities. As a consequence, the in-  decision to international and to state and local
cidence  of rural  poverty  is  now  as  high  or  levels of public decision making. The need for
higher than  that  of central  cities  (O'Hare).  new international institutions and policy and
Rural homelessness  is growing.  Problems of  for the  coordination  of those  institutions  to
ruralcommunity decline and development have  maintain  economic  stability  is urgent. State
accumulated largely untended (Barkley). Rural  andlocalneedscreate a maoropportunityfor
development,  however, now appears to be  a  the universities,  if they will grasp it.
growing  political  issue  in  Congress  and  in  Today the U.S. agenda of rural problems is
many states.  dominated by unanticipated externalities and
As  a consequence  of the rising  economic  the  consequences  of obsolescent  and  failed
value of time, issues in human capital forma-  institutions, including failed policies that need
tion  have  become  more  important determi-  modification or replacement,  and by the need
nants of local community and national welfare.  for new institutions and new human capital.
42Ethical  issues  abound.  We  have  failed  to  from general subject matter knowledge  to a
achieve an appropriate balance in the comple-  practical decision. Before disciplinary or even
mentary investments necessary for effective  multidisciplinary  subject  matter  knowledge
development of a sustainable agriculture and  has direct relevance for someone with a spe-
a  viable  rural  community.  More  than  cific problem, it must usually be fashioned into
technology-oriented  research is necessary to  multi-disciplinaryproblem-solving  knowledge.
solve  these  kinds  of problems.  More  than  That is, it must be developed into a contextu-
disciplinary knowledge is necessary if societal  ally specific form that is relevant to a single
problems  and  issues  are  to  be  addressed  decision maker (or a set of decision makers)
effectively.  A better balanced investment  is  with a specific practical problem.
necessary. What does that mean? In addition, philosophic distinctions between
FORCES THAT CHANGE  SOCIETY'S  value, value-free, and prescriptive knowledge
CAPACITY AND PRODUCTIVITY  of  the  four  prime  movers  are  relevant.
Problem-solving research  differs from disci-
As the development literature clearly dem-  plinary and subject matter research in that it
onstrates, there are four primary sources  of  seeks prescriptions (i.e., it necessarily produces
increased societal capacity. These prime mov-  "should"  or "ought" statements that depend
ers include not only technological change (only  on value as well as value-free knowledge). One
some of which  is science  based)  but institu-  may hold all three types of knowledge, value-
tional improvement, increases in human capa-  free as well as value knowledge and prescrip-
bility  (human  capital  formation),  and  the  tive knowledge about disciplinary and subject
growth of biological and physical capital both  matter categories. Problem-solvingknowledge
natural  and  man-made  (Bonnen,  1987).  The  comes in prescriptive form. To get to prescrip-
social sciences share with the other sciences  tive knowledge, one must process knowledge
and the humanities responsibility for creating  about  values  plus  (relatively)  value-free
knowledge  about  these primary  sources  of  knowledge  through a decision rule (or set of
change  in  societal  capacity.  But,  as  Ruttan  decision rules) to make an "ought" or "should"
points  out, it is the social  sciences that have  statement about action. Ought or should state-
primary responsibility  for providing knowl-  ments are the form toward  which  problem-
edge for modifying institutions or developing  solving knowledge moves (Johnson,  1986, pp.
new institutions (Ruttan). This is our primary  14-16).
domain.
THE SPECTRUM OF RESEARCH  PHILOSOPHIC VALUE POSITIONS
One  may  do  different  kinds  of research  Different epistemological positions may be
about these prime movers. For our purposes,  held with respect  to knowledge.  Indeed, the
it is useful to distinguish between disciplinary,  distinctions I have just made arise in good part
subject matter, and problem-solving research  out of the clash of different philosophic  value
(Johnson, 1986, pp. 11-29). The term "basic re-  positions that inform different epistemologies.
search"  I  take  to  refer  to  disciplinary re-  The concept of value-free knowledge is that of
search, which  is the theory, empirical  meas-  the pure and the logical positivists who argue
urements  and measurement  techniques,  and  that the only descriptive knowledge that can
methods used to explain  a fundamental  class  be objective and therefore scientific is value-
of  phenomena of  concern in a discipline such as  free  knowledge.  Other  supposedly  descrip-
physics, botany, economics, or philosophy. In-  tive knowledge  is  subjective,  metaphysical,
creasing this knowledge improves the capac-  and unscientific to logical positivists. Philoso-
ity of a discipline.  phers discredited extreme forms of positivism
Other types of research  are of an applied,  decades ago. Sophisticated physical scientists,
multidisciplinary nature. There are two forms.  while  often  philosophically  positivistic,  no
Subject matterresearch  generates multidisci-  longer confine  themselves to logical  positiv-
plinary knowledge  useful to a set of decision  ism. Nevertheless,  logical positivism persists
makers facing a common set of problems. Ag-  among  some  biological  scientists  but,  para-
riculture is not a discipline but a subject mat-  doxically, is much more evident in the social
ter, as are agronomy, agricultural economics,  sciences. This is paradoxical because the social
farm management, animal husbandry, and bio-  sciences must directly confront the problem of
technology.  Only  rarely can  one go  directly  values in treating human behavior,  which is
43central to their domain. The extreme forms of  kind, there is no such thing as final or perfect
positivism, pure positivism  and  logical posi-  knowledge.
tivism, do not completely  meet the needs  of  A third philosophic value position is that of
social  scientists.  Philosophers  have  demon-  pragmatism.  The  pragmatist  argues  that
strated that there  is  no  such thing  as com-  value-free  and value knowledge  are interde-
pletely value-free knowledge  or a value-free  pendent  in their  consequences  and that  at-
science. It is possible,  on the  other hand, to  temptstoestablish a cleardistinction between
produce  knowledge  that  is relatively  value  them are arbitrary and mistaken. The truth of
free (positivism) orwhere the values are clearly  knowledge is viewed as dependent on its prac-
identified (assumed) that condition otherwise  tical consequences. Thus, truth is instrumen-
positive knowledge (conditional normativism).  tal and dependent  on the use of knowledge.
Descriptive knowledge is partially acquired  The ultimate test of truth is workability,  al-
through the five senses and is analytic (logical  though coherence and clarity are relevant ex
and conceptual) as well as synthetic (descrip-  ante tests ofpragmatic prescriptions, the form
tive). It combines  axiomatic  or tautological,  in which most pragmatists frame any inquiry.
analytic  (theory) statements  with undefined  This philosophic  value  position tends  to be
primitive  terms  known  through  experience  held by most long-experienced policy makers
and  interaction  to produce  contingent  syn-  and, within the colleges ofagriculture, by most
thetic  (descriptive)  statements  about  the  extension staff and some resident instructors.
perceived reality of nature, human, and other  Indeed, it is the typical philosophic value posi-
behaviors, etc. The analytic statements  con-  tion  or  epistemology  of  problem  solving
stitute formal science or the theoretical  con-  (Johnson, 1986, pp. 65-75).
tent  of the  disciplines,  while  the  synthetic  Thereisafourthphilosophicpositionthatis
statements constitute what is called empirical  epistemologically relevant to policy. This is an
or  factual  science.  In positivism,  truth  de-  eclecticismthatarguesthattheepistemologi-
pends on the tests of correspondence  (experi-  cl ground on which one chooses to stand to ad-
ence), logical coherence (internal consistency),  dress a particular inquiry not only should de-
and clarity (the proposition to be tested is not  pend on the specific purposes of the inquiry (
ambiguous or vague) (Johnson, 1986,pp. 41-53).  la pragmatism) but that different philosophic
Another set of major philosophic value po-  positions and epistemologies maybe combined
sitions canbe described as normativism. There  as  appropriate  to  address  various  parts  of
are many philosophic orientations that struc-  complex inquiries  (Johnson,  1986, pp. 22-27,
ture the treatment of values, but in normativ-  221-235).
ism pursuit of knowledge  about goodness  or  This  is a vastly  oversimplified  view  of a
badness dominates  the epistemology.  State-  very difficult set of problems on which philoso-
ments about goodness and badness can be re-  phers continue to differ. I will not explore it
garded  as  contingent  synthetic  (empirical)  further other than to assert that unless one
statements.  As  with  value-free  knowledge,  has some gsp of these elements from mod-
value knowledge  can be viewed as experien-  ern ogic,philosophicvaluetheory,  andepiste-
tial and thus acquirable through the five senses.  mology,  one will soon get lost in most meth-
In this view, the tests of truth in positivism  odological  and  epistemological  arguments
can be applied to knowledge of goodness and  central to any area of scientific or humanistic
badness  to  support  the  claim  of  objective  inquiry.
descriptive knowledge  of values that is sub-
ject to the tests of correspondence, coherence,
and clarity (Johnson, 1986, pp. 54-64).  NATURE  OF POLICY ANALYSIS
Both  positive  (value-free)  and  normative  Having defined a few essential terms, let
(value) knowledge ultimately depend on a leap  me  turn to  policy  and  distinguish  between
of faith that the five senses reflect something  policy analysis and economic analysis. We have
real in nature and are not perceptual illusions.  a tendency to equate them, which is erroneous
Thus both depend on philosophic "primitives,"  and  leads  to great  confusion  among  econo-
undefined terms known from experience (e.g.,  mists. Policy decision making is essentially  a
good/bad, hot/cold). Neither value nor value-  problem-solvingmatterandhastobedescribed
free knowledge may be regarded as knowable  as multidisciplinary and prescriptive. That is,
with certainty. In science all knowledge is con-  societal problems  do not come arranged  and
tingent, and thus subject to revision. Forman-  delimited  by  discipline.  They  are not based
44solely on economics or on any other single dis-  the direct stakeholders; that is, the individu-
cipline;  they are multidisciplinary.  Different  als  or  groups  that  will  be  affected  by  the
kinds of  knowledge are needed with the mix of  decision, some subset of whom are part of the
relevant fields depending on the nature of the  distribution  of power and in whom some de-
problem domain.  One analyst  may do demo-  gree  of influence  or  power  over the  policy
graphic modeling, another economic analysis,  process resides. This inquiry must produce a
and another toxicological research to address  policy prescription  (i.e., prescriptive  knowl-
a public policy  problem involving  food chain  edge). This prescription (Z) will depend on:
poisoning. The decision maker or his/her staff.  some normative  (evaluative)  presump-
of policy  analysts must  then combine  these  1  s  n  (  presump- of  policy  analysts must  then combine  these  tion that a policy goal is ethically or morally
applied,  disciplinary  research  outputs  with  ustified (N);
knowledge  about the  specific context  of the 
decision to be made. This includes such mat-  2.  some relatively value-free  (descriptive
ters as politics, the actors' motives  who are  and  analytic)  presumption  that  in  a  given
involved in the policy decision, and constraints  context  a  specific  set of  policy  actions  will
imposed by prior policy  decisions.  Only then  efficiently achieve the policy goals (P); and,
are practical  information  evaluating a prob-  3. some  set of decision rules accepted by
lem and realistic policy options available.  Fi-  participants  in the policy-making process  as
nally, when a decision maker chooses between  legitimate (R).
those options, a prescription about which option
"should be" acted on has been formed.  Since  Thus, a prescriptive statement as to what the
policy  analysis  is multidisciplinary  and  pre-  policy goal (Z) should or ought to be is derived
scriptive, it makes no sense at all to talk about  from normative  (N) and  positive (P) knowl-
applied  economics  or the  application  of any  edge processed  through  a decision rule  (R).
one  discipline  as  policy  analysis.  Economic  Implicit  in  any  set of decision  rules  is the
analysis  is often a necessary input, but it is  existing distribution  of power. Policy has of-
never sufficient for good policy analysis.  ten been described as the art of the possible,
which clearly implies that the holders of  power
There  is  another  characteristic  of policy  in any given context have  a lot to say about
analysis that needs to be understood; that is,  both what the rules are and the policy  out-
the decision process  is dynamic.  One  cannot  come. Keep  in mind that each primary actor
accept  one-shot static  or comparative  static  participating in this debate may come to a dif-
analysis as if it were adequate for policy analy-  ferent initial conclusion as to what the policy
sis. When working to support policy makers,  goal  (Z)  should  be,  since  each  begins  with
you are likely to have to redo  analysis  with  different views of P  N, and even R. Thus, the
different assumptions  and  variables  several  policy goal that finally results is a negotiated
times before a policy decision is final. Thus, in  one strongly  influenced  by each  actor's per-
policy making one is involved in a process that  ception  of the power distribution  and his  or
is an iterative and interactive process of learn-  her self-interest.
ing (Johnston and Clark, pp. 9-35). Usually the
policy  analyst  and  even policy  makers  have  The second step involves a rather different
only a partial command of what the context for  kind of inquiry.  Given the policy  goal Z,  the
the decision is and what the facts are. Conse-  question  becomes  what  action(s)  should  be
quently,  faced with unavoidable uncertainty  taken to achieve that goal? Thus the policy im-
an analyst  does  the best he  or she  can, but  plementation prescription depends on:
must stand ready to modify the analysis from  1. some set of resources to use in implem-
day to day and  week to week in any  policy  entation (e.g.,  human resources  and political
process focused on a specific major decision.  trading material);
Policy  analysis  involves  a process  of se-  2.  some  specific  policy  and  political  con-
quential  inquiry. Without going into a lot of  text, which would include such matters as the
detail, let me break that down into two sub-  relevant  power distribution  (e.g.,  actors  for
sets. The first step, or inquiry set, isaddressed  and against to be dealt with), past policy ac-
in a series of questions beginning with "What  tions that constitute support foror constraints
is the problem?"  "What  should we  do about  on the current policy goal,  other matters on
it?" "Who is involved as a stakeholder?" The  the policy  agenda that may  impinge on this
stakeholders  typically will include the policy  policy goal, national and international  events
makers, the analysts who support them, and  external to the policy process, and the state of
45public opinion;  The policy analyst should never expect the
3.  the persuasiveness  of one's normative  process to be neat or follow a formal organiza-
presumptions  (N) involving  such matters as  tional pattern as is often implied in textbooks
political and economic equity;  and by the media version of events.  The in-
4.  the completeness and certainty of one's  tended  results  of policy decisions  are often
value-free presumptions  (P); and  swamped  by  the  unintended  consequences.
f  .. r  . pu  . ().  aThat  is, uncertainty  and  lack  of knowledge
5.  the possibility of modifying the effective  dominate  both  the  policy  decision  and  the
distribution of power (e.g., with side trades).  implementation  processes. For example, the implementation  processes. For example, the
Out of these elements, one fashions a specific  initial PIK budget costs of the farm program
strategy or strategies that have the best proba-  astonished OMB, whose idea itwas and whose
bility of achieving the policy goal Z. This too is  goal  was reduction  of budget exposure!  Fi-
never a one-step process. Rather it is an iter-  nally, the reality is that the policy process is so
ative, interactive, trial and error or learning  uncertain and messy that the common notion
process that generally ends in some compro-  that  outcomes  arise  from  the  collusion  and
mise achieving only a portion of one's original  plottingofthe powerfulis almost always wrong.
goal.  They certainly try. But they rarely,  if ever,
Thus, every policy decision involves values  succeed.  Rather,  disasters  and  undesired
and prescriptions; there is no such thing as a  outcomes  are dominated  or explained  most
value-free  decision, despite  some silly state-  frequently by greed, incompetence, stupidity,
ments by a few economists  and other social  and ignorance, the four horsemen of the policy
scientists  that  draw  contempt  from  policy  arena.
makers and politicians. Every policy decision
inevitably involves problem solving in which  THE LIMITATIONS OF
there is a compromise of goals and values in a  CONVENTIONAL  ECONOMIC
learning process that is iterative and interac-  THEORY IN POLICY ANALYSIS
tive. This is a process in which organized inter-
Public policy deals frequently with a mix- ests are in conflict and which is influenced by  uof  maet ad non-market  equity and
existing political institutions, the stakehold-
ing  actors,  the  prior  decisions  and  political  efficiency  problems, often in situations of in- ing actors,  the  prior  decisions  and  political complete markets or market failure involving commitments  that  the  responsible  decision
makr) have  alr  all  of whh  public  goods. It involves policy instruments maker(s)  have  already  made--all  of  which imposing positive and negative private incen- condition what is possible at any point in time.  i  g p  e ad n  e  atin tives (taxes, subsidies, transfers,  regulation,
What are some of the implications of  this for  etc.).  Policy  also  involves  public  andquasi-
an economist  who is  a policy analyst?  Since  public good investments  and their coordina-
policy decision making involves problem solv-  tion  with  private  investments)  in  the  four
ing,  the  implication  for the  professions  re-  forces that alter the capacity of society: human
search and for the policy analyst's work sug-  capital, institutions,  technology, and conven-
gests a very different kind of enterprise from  tionalbiologicaland physical capital. Thus, the
the  disciplinary  orientation  of much  of the  appropriate  assumptions  for policy  analysis
profession.  Another  implication  very  fre-  will more  often than not differ from the  as-
quently is that economics is not the dominant  sumptions  of the perfectly  competitive  neo-
element even when the problem is primarily  classical model. This will depend on the nature
economic, although  something is being opti-  of the markets involved as well as the nature
mized even if, from an economic point of view,  f the commodities, the motives, and the pol-
it is only  tion  the  icy  issues  th  best solutionat  are  central  to  the  problem
Another implication is that, even though one  domain. In addition, as I have pointed out, all
finds  it distressing  or  even repugnant,  one  problem solving is multidisciplinary  and eco-
must deal with the legitimate actors and insti-  nomics is only  one subset of the universe  of
tutions, whoever they may be, if one is to play  knowledge that is needed.  Let me be a little
in the  real game.  The legitimate  actors are  more specif
those holding power as well as others affected
by the outcomes. Only the latter may safely be  Atomistic Markets
ignored, and often, if major moral wrong is in-
volved, they may not be ignored  with impu-  Conventional neoclassicaltheorymakesthe
nity (Cairncross, Nelson).  assumption that markets are atomistic struc-
tures of many buyers and sellers in which all
46actors are price takers and cannot  influence  fixity is not possible in the simplest neoclassi-
the  market  as individual  participants.  This  cal  model,  since  salvage  values will  always
may or may not be true in the real world, so one  equal acquisition prices (Johnson, 1972).
must pay close attention to the structure of
any  product  or  factor  markets  involved  in  Perfect Rivalness
one's problem set. ~one~'~s problem  set.  ~Closely  related to the divisibility assump-
tion  is the  assumption  of perfect  rivalness,
Divisibility  of Goods and Services  which  means  that  the  consumption  by  one
Another  assumption  is that all goods and  precludes  or is incompatible with  consump-
services are divisible; that is, there is no lumpi-  tionby any other consumer. However, in many
ness in either the output or input of the pro-  cases, such as national defense or some types
duction process. Lumpy inputs for example, if  of  information, consumption by one individual
extreme  enough, can create high fixed costs  does not reduce the supply for others. This
and declining average costs that lead toward  opens up the potential for someone to use  a
fewer, larger firms and greater concentration  good who has not paid for it-and raises the
in a market. In the extreme case a single firm  question of cost sharing and fairness.  These
or monopoly results.  are nonrival or joint impact  goods (Schmid,
pp. 75-94).
No External Economies  and
Diseconomies  Low Exclusion Costs
It also is assumed that there are no external  Here  a  second  characteristic  comes  into
economies  or diseconomies  in production  or  play. This involves the ability of producers to
consumption  in  the  perfectly  competitive  exclude from use of their product those who
model.  This is to say that there  is no diver-  do not pay for it. This creates a situation in
gence between social and private costs in ei-  which,  if exclusion  costs  are  high  and  free
ther production or consumption. Where this is  riders cannot be excluded, the cost of produc-
true, there is no justification for public inter-  ing the good cannot be recaptured out of the
vention. But it is often untrue.  market. Thus, one has an imperfect market in
which  a social investment  is required  if the
Perfect Knowledge  good is to be available. The question then is
Perfet knowl  of marke  n  r  how feasible is it for the producer to exclude Perfect knowledge  of markets and produc- those who do not pay (i.e., is the cost of exclu- tion possibilities is assumed. This implies that 
no  uncertainty  exists  and  thus  information  sionhighorlow)?Theanswerdependsonthe
has zero value and the decision maker has no  nature ofthe productandits uses. If  exclusion
need  for  or  demand  for  information.  The  costs are high, the producer cannot fully ap-
moment uncertainty  characterizes  a decision  propriate the returns,  for example,  once  an moment uncertainty characterizes  a decision information product is disseminated. Where environment,  information  is  necessary  to  i  i  i  i  exclusion costs are high, even producer pat- reduce  that uncertainty  and, therefore,  may  e  sn  cos ar  high  even producer pat- ents and copyrights will not prevent  others have substantial value. Uncertainty is charac-  ro  sin  inoration  winot prevent  others
teristic  of most markets,  and, consequently,
For an information  product to be privately information becomes an economic good that is
provided, the producer  must be able  to re- essential for the efficient functioning of those  ovde  th  roducr mut  able  to  re-
markets.  cover his costs through appropriation  of re- turns from its sale. This assumes low exclu-
sion costs. When exclusion costs are high, this
Perfect Mobility  is difficult to achieve (Schmid, pp. 35-61).
The assumption  of perfect  mobility  of all  The libertarian assertions that the private
commodities  and resources  means there are  sector can solve all problems are quite as inde-
no institutionalimpediments to the movement  fensible as the idea that the public sector can
of resources  and,  in the  simplest  model,  no  efficiently  provide  any  good.  Both proposi-
transaction costs. The consequence is that all  tions are simple minded and have been well
adjustment  is costless.  In reality,  we  know  tested in this century. Clearly, the real world
that there is immobility, and therefore adjust-  is more complex, and economists can do better
ment is lagged and costly. An important impli-  than start from "flat earth" assumptions when
cation  of the perfect mobility  assumption  is  the earth is obviously round.
that  there  are  no  specialized  assets.  Asset  The policy analyst must be alert in the use
47of economic theory to the sensitivity of con-  agriculture,  while  the  simpler  neoclassical
ventional assumptions to the facts of the real  model is helpless to explain it (Johnson, 1972).
world, which often diverge from those of the  Transaction  costs  include:  (1) the costs  of
simple  neoclassical  model.  About  this  time  information  necessary to reduce uncertainty
somebody will say this is an attack on neoclas-  about the problems  at issue,  (2) the  costs of
sical economics. Far from it! "Occam's razor"  negotiating a specific agreement or new pol-
is not repealed.  One uses what one has. And  icy,  and  finally  (3)  the  cost of enforcing the
often  there  are not  too many  good  alterna-  terms  of  any  new  agreement  or  policy
tives. But  some very interesting  things  are  (Williamson, pp.20-22). Enforcing agreements
happening in economic theory that hold real  is high risk in policy because of the unforeseen
promise for both economic analysis and policy  consequences that invariably flow from policy
analysis.  The  younger  generation  of econo-  decisions as well as out of the uncertain future
mists is now focused to a substantial degree on  effects from today's integration of commodity
what happens  when  one modifies  the tradi-  and capital markets internationally and their
tional assumptions of  neoclassical theory. This  feedback on policy. There are also the unantici-
has been described as the "new institutional  pated  effects  of policy  decisions  made  else-
economics," a tent that covers a rather diverse  where in the world.
set of activities ranging from developments in  The cost of negotiations  can be very high
the economics of information, risk and uncer-  because there are often three sets of negotia-
tainty, and public choice theory, through stud-  tions going on simultaneously. Within any or-
ies of incomplete markets to the economics of  ganization, one must establish  an agreement
transaction costs ("New Economists"),  on the negotiating  posture of that organiza-
I have time only to point out the implications  tion,  compromising  internal  conflicts.  Then
of transaction cost analysis. Oliver Williamson  there is the need to negotiate with one's part-
has  identified  those  modifications  of  the  ners in some  coalition  of organizations  with
neoclassical assumptions that create a situation  shared  interests  to  establish  a  negotiating
in  which,  as he  puts it, institutions  become  position for the coalition as it pursues its goals
important.  That is, when  do you substitute  in the policy process. Policy making is inevita-
alternative institutions for the market, and,  bly  an  activity  of  coalition  formation  in  a
when you do,  what kind  of institutions?  My  democratic  society.  Finally, once you have a
point is that Oliver Williamson and others are  coalition you must negotiate with other organ-
extending the  neoclassical  model  making it  ized interests and entities in the policy arena
much more  useful,  as well as more complex  external to your coalition in order to achieve
(North, Bromley).  some specific  policy action.
Briefly put, transaction costs do not arise in  The  transaction  cost  concept  illuminates
the economists' assumed neoclassical world of  much of the behavior  of the major interests
perfect  knowledge,  perfect  rationality,  and  and the formal governing entities that partici-
perfectly mobile resources. Transaction costs  pate  in the  policy process  and  whose  quasi
arise in the real and uncertain world of imper-  rents  are threatened  by  proposals  to make
feet knowledge,  which Oliver Williamson re-  major changes in existing policy (Browne and
fers to as limited cognitive competence, where  Bonnen). For example, decoupling and target-
bounded rationality dominates. For transac-  ing or complete  elimination  of subsidies are
tion costs to arise also requires imperfect ra-  very destabilizing goals politically in the sense
tionality, that is, where opportunistic behav-  that the transaction costs are very high assur-
ior (self-interest  seeking with guile) intrudes  ing a very  costly political  brawl,  if pursued
to take advantage of the imperfect knowledge  relentlessly. The new institutional economics
of others. Finally, neither of these conditions  makes it clear that a major obstacle to funda-
create insurmountable difficulties except when  mental change in institutions and policies even
they combine  with the imperfect mobility of  in the face of strong pressure and persuasive
resources  where  specialization  of assets  (or  reasons for such change can be traced to vari-
asset fixity) immobilizes resources in produc-  ous types  of transaction  costs.  Thus,  I  find
tion (Williamson, pp. 43-67). This creates the  transaction costs analysis to be very useful in
potential  for  significant  asset  (quasi-rent)  thinking about the problems of policy.
losses when the expectations under which the
original investment in specialized assets was
made  subsequently  fail  to  hold.  This  helps
explain  why chronic excess capacity plagues
48ORGANIZING  TO DO POLICY  isolated from the stimulation of society's prob-
RESEARCH  lems.
The stability of knowledge is very different  Science  is strongly  criticized  today.  Since
as one goes from disciplinary through subject  World  War II society  has invested  in basic
matter to problem-solving research (Johnson,  science accumulating great knowledge, much
1986, pp. 195-206,215-220).  The university is  ofwhichhasbeenappliedbutrelatively  slowly.
devoted  to  conserving  and  creating  knowl-  This movement of basic knowledge into prac-
edge and to transferring knowledge from one  tical products and uses has been slow enough
generation to another. The core of the univer-  that the Japanese  and others are takingU.S.
sityis organized aroundbasicdisciplines. These  basic  science knowledge  and turning  it into
disciplines, as far as research is concerned, are  products  and capturing  markets faster than
usually accountable  only to their disciplinary  the United States is able to today. Society in-
peers.  Professional  schools  or  institutes,  creasingly  views  academic  science  and  the
however,  are not disciplinary  organizations.  university  as narrow  and  self-serving.  Our
societal support and legitimacy have declined. They-are subject matter organizations. Being  societal support and legitimacy have declined.
subject matter in nature, they are multidisci-  Thus, the university is under pressure to form
plinary and accountable  not just to an appro-  consortia  and  other  links  with  the  private
priateset of peers in various disciplines but to  sector and  to respond  to government  direc-
the sponsors of research and to the users ofthe  tives in order to move new knowledge  out of
knowledge  generated  in  research.  Problem  the university and professional  ournals and
solving is usually done in the university within  into  the  market  more  effectively  and  with
consortia that  are temporary  in  nature and  greater speed. Historically, there have been
focused on a specific problem. They come and  only two major academic subsets where there
go. So the university structure  is made up of  been reasonable  coordination  of discipli-
disciplinary and subject matter organizations.  nary, subject matter, and problem-solving ef-
The  reason  for this  is  clear.  The rate  of  forts. One i  agriculture. The other is in medi-
obsolescence in disciplinary knowledge is very  cine where the linkage between the academi
slow. That is to say, disciplinary knowledge is  research  hospitals  and the general  hospitals
quitestable. Subject matterknowledgeis some-  that treat the bulk of the patients is a fairly
what less stable, turning over more rapidly as  effective one. In both cases there are a set of
the world changes and as knowledge  flowing  institutional arrangements and a process that
out ofthe disciplines changes. Problem-solving  hold together and coordinate  the entire con-
knowledge is quite unstable in the sense that  tiuum of knowledge (Bonnen,  1986b).
it loses its relevance within fairly short periods  In agricultural economics, if  we focus solely
of time, so as a rule we do not organize around  on disciplinary  research, we will at best be-
problems. We organize around subject matters,  come second-rate economics departments.  In
such as agriculture, medicine, engineering, or  a few cases,  some university  provosts have
business,  in  order to  maintain  a base  from  alreadybegunto askwhythe university needs
which to do problem solving.  two economics departments.  In many univer-
We have a problem today in the land-grant  sities, no-win situations have been created for
university and indeed, in this profession. We  collegesofagriculturewheredisciplinarystan-
have presidents, provosts, deans, and faculty  dards  of peer-reviewed  publications  are im-
arguing that the enterprise should be focused  posed university-wide  as the sole criteria for
exclusively on discipline, while others within  promotion and salary increases.  This is quite
some professional schools argue for an exclu-  inappropriate  if limited  to disciplinary jour-
sive  (applied)  subject  matter  and  problem-  nals. If the colleges  of agriculture  and other
solvingfocus. Botharguments arein error. The  professional  schools)  cannot  maintain  a  re-
real problem is one of finding an appropriately  ward  system  that allows  them  to  invest in
balanced investment in all three: disciplinary,  some balanced way in all three  forms of re-
subject matter, and problem-solving  capabil-  search, we are not likely to be very effective in
ity. Especially in applied fields such as agricul-  the  long run  and,  indeed,  may  not  survive.
ture, if we do not maintain and coordinate that  Some  universities  may already be  past the
continuum of knowledge, we will not get an ef-  point  where  any reasonable  balance  is pos-
fective movement of new disciplinary output  sible without external political intervention.
through  the  subject  matters  into  problem-  There  are also a few examples  of exactly
solving  efforts.  And  the  disciplines  will  be  the  opposite  situation  in  which  colleges  of
agriculture have focused so completely on the
49applied  subject matter and problem-solving  Most of the time this judgment is based on the
end of the continuum of knowledge that they  quite inappropriate application of disciplinary
have lost effective  linkage to the disciplines  criteria  to  an  enterprise  whose  purpose  is
and are slowly deteriorating in their capacity  producing more than just disciplinary, indeed,
to  sustain  first-rate  subject  matter  and  mostly subject matter and problem-solving,
problem  solving capacity.  The accusation  of  outputs.  This  is  then  judged  "second-rate
second-rate  science is made in general about  science." We should object strenuously to such
the  colleges  of agriculture.  But it is  a  fair  unfair and inappropriate performance criteria.
criticism  in  only  a limited number of cases.
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